Publications 2024

Publications 2024
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祝贺德恒纽约陈小敏律师团队和德恒北京陈效律师团队成功帮助在中国科创版上市的某新能源制造业公司在美国诉讼中和解。
Congratulations to the DeHeng New York team led by Attorney Chen Xiaomin and the DeHeng Beijing team led by Attorney Chen Xiao for successfully assisting a new energy manufacturing company listed on the STAR Market in China in reaching a settlement in a U.S. lawsuit.

荣幸地宣布，德恒纽约与北京团队代表第三方被告成功解决了一起产品责任案件。经过八个月的努力，我们在证据发现阶段前达成了调解和解，从而为客户显著减少了诉讼成本，这标志着一项重要的进展。

The DeHeng New York and Beijing teams, representing a third-party defendant, are pleased to announce the successful resolution of a product liability case. After eight months of diligent effort, we reached a settlement before the discovery phase, significantly reducing litigation costs for our client, marking an important milestone.

尽管原告要求的赔偿金额远高于最终和解金额，但作为第三方被告，客户最终支付的金额仅是原告初始要求的一小部分。尽管对方并未使用威胁性言辞，但其持续要求高额赔偿金使谈判一度陷入僵局。然而，凭借团队的持续努力和专业知识，我们最终达成了一项令各方满意的解决方案。

Although the plaintiff's initial demand far exceeded the final settlement amount, our client, as a third-party defendant, ultimately paid only a fraction of the original demand. Despite the plaintiff's persistent demands for a high settlement, which led to stalled negotiations, our team's continuous efforts and expertise resulted in a mutually satisfactory resolution.

从接受委托到最终达成调解和解，德恒纽约和北京的律师团队展现出了专业精神。我们精心处理每一个细节，提交答复，管理文件请求，处理发现要求，并进行多次更新和会议。这次合作体现了跨国法律服务的优势，确保了每一个环节都得到了充分的关注，从而确保了案件的顺利解决。

From the moment we were retained to the final settlement, the DeHeng New York and Beijing teams demonstrated professionalism. We meticulously handled every detail, from filing responses and managing document requests to handling discovery demands and conducting numerous updates and meetings. This cooperation highlighted the advantages of cross-border legal services, ensuring that every aspect of the case received thorough attention, leading to a successful resolution.

这一重要进展证明了我们德恒团队在应对案件复杂性方面的承诺和能力。客户对调解结果表示满意，并赞扬了德恒纽约和北京律师团队的专业精神和所取得的成果。这一成功案例不仅展示了德恒中美律师团队在国际法律事务中的优势，也为未来跨国法律合作提供了有益的经验。

This significant achievement underscores our DeHeng team’s commitment and ability to handle complex cases. The client expressed satisfaction with the settlement outcome and praised the DeHeng New York and Beijing teams for their professionalism and the results achieved. This successful case not only showcases the strengths of the DeHeng China-U.S. legal teams in international legal matters but also provides valuable experience for future cross-border legal cooperation.

DraftKings因法律问题停止Non-Fungible Token(“NFT”)市场

DraftKings Discontinues NFT (non-fungible token) Marketplace Amid Legal Concerns

On July 30, 2024, DraftKings announced its decision to discontinue its NFT Marketplace. The company cited “recent legal considerations” as the reason for this move. This decision follows a recent ruling by a federal district court in Massachusetts, which refused to dismiss a proposed class action lawsuit against DraftKings. The suit claimed that the NFTs sold on DraftKings' Marketplace were unregistered securities.

The legal background centers on the Supreme Court's longstanding Howey decision, which defines a contract as an investment contract and thus a security if it involves an 1) investment of money, 2) in a common enterprise, 3) with an expectation of profits derived 4) solely from the efforts of others, such as a promoter or third party. In this case, DraftKings argued that their NFTs were similar to baseball or Pokémon cards and not securities. However, the judge disagreed. There was no dispute regarding the first Howey factor, the investment of money. For the second factor, "common enterprise," the court found sufficient allegations of asset pooling, as revenue from NFT sales was reinvested into DraftKings' business. The third factor, an expectation of profit, was supported by DraftKings' statements on the "guaranteed scarcity" of certain NFTs, which communicated to potential buyers that these NFTs were a unique investment opportunity, likely to appreciate in value. This marketing approach directly contributes to the expectation that purchasers are not just buying digital items for enjoyment but are also making an investment intended to yield financial returns. Lastly, the court held that the value of the NFTs was plausibly dependent on the success of the DraftKings Marketplace, satisfying the fourth Howey factor.

Cryptocurrency trading has been receiving greater attention from US regulators. In 2023, the SEC brought approximately $3 billion worth of action related to cryptocurrency trading, showing a 53% year-over-year increase involving more than $280 million in settlement. Further, the SEC has intensified its focus on major crypto exchanges, such as Coinbase and Binance. In 2023, Coinbase was charged with operating as an unregulated national securities exchange and failing to register its crypto asset staking program. Binance faced allegations of secretly allowing high-value U.S. customers to trade on its platform, commingling customer assets, and misleading investors.

SEC Chair Gary Gensler has asserted that major crypto exchanges are "likely trading securities” and need to register with the SEC, emphasizing that new technologies must comply with existing laws. He has also called for increased enforcement of stablecoins and other crypto tokens. In 2022, the SEC expanded its Cyber Unit, renaming it the Crypto Assets and Cyber Unit, and increased its size by 66% to bolster crypto enforcement efforts. Gensler, a known crypto-skeptic, has highlighted the prevalence of fraud and manipulation in the crypto field, particularly following the 2024 launch of spot bitcoin ETFs.

Shifting its attention from individual tokens to trading platforms, the SEC has made the examination of the offer, sale, and trading of crypto assets a top priority for 2024. The Howey Test is central to the SEC’s arguments. The agency asserts that crypto lending and staking products are unregistered securities.

The SEC collaborates with various partners, including the Department of Justice and international authorities, to enforce regulations. The IRS has increased efforts to crack down on tax evasion within the crypto industry, while the Treasury Department targets privacy coins and stablecoins that could pose financial risks. The ongoing legal battles and regulatory efforts highlight the SEC’s determination to define and enforce securities laws within the rapidly evolving crypto industry.

The strict regulation of cryptocurrency trading platforms and products in the US has global implications, particularly for countries like China that take a hard stance on cryptocurrencies. The enforcement actions and related rulings by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against unregistered securities reinforce the global trend of regulating cryptocurrencies as securities. China has already implemented stringent measures to crack down on cryptocurrency trading and mining. The legal developments in the US may further prompt China to strengthen its existing regulatory framework.

Specifically, if US courts continue to classify cryptocurrencies and related products as securities and require them to comply with securities laws, China may adopt similar legal definitions and enforcement models, further tightening its regulation of domestic cryptocurrency activities. Additionally, the US crackdown on major cryptocurrency exchanges like Coinbase and Binance may alert China to closely monitor domestic and international cryptocurrency trading platforms to prevent them from circumventing Chinese regulations through cross-border operations.

Overall, these legal actions in the US not only reinforce the global consensus on stringent cryptocurrency regulation but also may drive China to implement even stricter measures in this sector to maintain financial stability and mitigate financial risks.

2024年7月30日，DraftKings宣布决定停止其NFT市场。公司将此举归因于对“近期相关法律法规的重新考量”。这一决定紧随马萨诸塞州联邦地区法院的一项裁决，该裁决拒绝驳回对DraftKings提起的拟议集体诉讼。诉讼声称DraftKings市场上销售的NFT是未注册的证券。

DraftKings是一家总部位于美国的公司，专门提供每日幻想体育（DFS）和体育博彩服务。成立于2012年，DraftKings允许用户通过其平台参加基于各种体育比赛（如橄榄球、棒球、篮球和足球等）的幻想体育比赛。用户可以创建自己的虚拟球队，根据现实世界运动员在比赛中的表现获得积分，并与其他用户竞争赢取奖品。近年来，DraftKings也扩展了其业务，包括在线体育博彩和iGaming（在线赌场游戏）。该公司在多个州获得了合法体育博彩的许可，并且其平台可以通过移动应用程序和网站访问。DraftKings因其创新的幻想体育比赛和合法的体育博彩服务而在体育爱好者中广受欢迎。截至2024年8月，DraftKings的市值约为178亿美元。

Draftking案的法律背景围绕最高法院长期以来的Howey判决展开，该判决定义了投资合同，并将其视为证券，如果它涉及1)资金的投入；2) 一个共同主体；3) 有利润回报的预期；4) 主要依靠于第三方的努力（例如推广者）。在本案中，DraftKings辩称其NFT类似于棒球卡或神奇宝贝卡（日本动漫），而不是证券。然而，法官不同意这一观点。对于Howey规则的第一个因素——资金投资，是没有争议的。对于第二个因素“一个共同的主体”，法院发现了有资产汇集的现象，因为NFT销售的收入被重新投资到DraftKings的业务中。第三个因素，即预期利润，由于DraftKings对某些NFT“保证稀缺性”的声明，这向潜在买家传达了这些NFT是一种独特的投资机会，可能会升值。这种营销方法直接导致购买者不仅购买数字物品以供娱乐，而且还进行投资以期获得利润回报。最后，法院认为这些NFT的价值是会依赖于DraftKings市场表现的成功与否，因此满足了Howey的第四个因素。

加密货币交易正受到美国监管机构的更多关注。2023年，美国证券交易委员会(“SEC”)对与加密货币交易相关的行为提起了约30亿美元的诉讼，相比去年增长了53%，涉及超过2.8亿美元的和解金额。此外，SEC加大了对主要加密交易所的关注，如Coinbase和Binance。2023年，Coinbase被指控作为未注册的全国证券交易所运营，并未能注册其加密资产质押计划。Binance则面临指控，称其秘密允许高价值的美国客户在其平台上进行交易，混合客户资产并误导投资者。

SEC主席Gary Gensler声称，主要的加密货币交易平台的行为与证券交易非常相似，因此应受到SEC的监管，并强调新兴技术必须遵守现有法律。他呼吁加强对稳定币和其他加密代币的执法力度。2022年，SEC将其网络部门扩展并更名为加密资产和网络部门，规模增加了66%，以加强对加密货币的监管。Gensler一直对加密货币持怀疑态度，特别是在2024年推出现货比特币ETF后，他强调了加密领域中的欺诈和操纵问题。

SEC已将2024年的首要任务定为审查加密资产的发行、销售和交易，重点从单个代币转向交易平台。Howey Test是SEC论点的核心，SEC认为加密贷款和质押产品是未注册的证券。为执行这些法规，SEC与司法部和国际当局等各种合作伙伴合作，IRS也加强了打击加密行业逃税的努力，而财政部则针对可能带来金融风险的隐私币和稳定币采取行动。持续的法律斗争和监管努力突显了SEC在快速发展的加密行业中定义和执行证券法的决心。

美国对加密货币交易平台和产品的严格监管具有全球性的影响，特别是在中国等对加密货币持强硬立场的国家。SEC针对未注册证券的执法行动和相关判决，强化了全球对加密货币作为证券进行监管的趋势。中国已经对加密货币交易和采矿采取了严厉打击措施，美国的法律进展可能会进一步促使中国加强其现有的监管框架。

具体而言，如果美国法院继续认定加密货币及其相关产品为证券，并要求其遵守证券法，那么中国可能会参考这种法律定义和执法模式，进一步严格监管国内的加密货币活动。此外，美国对主要加密货币交易所的打击，如Coinbase和Binance，可能促使中国更加警惕国内外加密货币交易平台，防止其通过跨国业务规避中国的法律监管。

总体而言，美国的这些法律行动不仅巩固了全球对加密货币严厉监管的共识，也可能推动中国在这一领域采取更严格的监管措施，以维护金融稳定和防范金融风险。

FTC关于竞业禁止条款的最终规则将于2024年9月4日生效
FTC Final Rule on Non-Compete Clauses to Take Effect September 4, 2024

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has announced that its final rule on non-compete clauses will take effect on September 4, 2024, marking a significant shift in the landscape of employment agreements. This new regulation prohibits employers from including non-compete clauses in contracts signed after this date, classifying such clauses as an unfair method of competition and rendering them unenforceable.
The rule aims to enhance worker mobility and reduce restrictions that can hinder career advancement and economic competition. From September 4, 2024, forward, any non-compete agreement between an employer and a worker will be considered void, significantly altering how businesses protect proprietary information and retain talent.
However, there is an important exception to this sweeping change. The rule allows existing non-compete agreements to remain in force for "senior executives" who receive annual compensation exceeding $151,164 and hold policy-making positions. This category includes chief executive officers, presidents, and other top executives with policy-making authority across an entire business entity. Notably, other C-suite officers without organization-wide policy-making authority do not fall under this definition and will be subject to the new rule.
For all other workers, any non-compete agreements that predate the rule will become unenforceable starting September 4, 2024. This aspect of the rule is expected to affect a wide range of industries and professions, leveling the playing field for employees across the board.
To ensure compliance, the FTC has instituted a notice requirement for employers. Employers must notify current workers under non-compete agreements that these agreements will be void after the effective date.
This rule represents a landmark development in employment law, with far-reaching implications for both employers and employees. The FTC’s decision underscores a commitment to promoting fair competition and protecting workers' rights, signaling a new era of workforce mobility and corporate accountability.

联邦贸易委员会（FTC）宣布，其关于竞业禁止条款的最终规则将于2024年9月4日生效，这标志着雇佣协议领域的重大变革。根据这一新法规，雇主在此日期之后签署的合同中不得包含竞业禁止条款，否则将被视为不公平竞争方式，从而不可执行。
这一规则旨在增强员工流动性，减少可能阻碍职业发展和经济竞争的限制。从2024年9月4日起，任何雇主与员工之间的竞业禁止协议将被视为无效，显著改变企业保护专有信息和保留人才的方式。
然而，这一广泛变化中有一个重要例外。规则允许现有的竞业禁止协议继续对“高级管理人员”生效，这些人员的年薪超过151,164美元，并且担任全公司范围内政策制定职位。这一类包括首席执行官、总裁及其他在整个业务实体内具有全公司内政策制定权的高管。值得注意的是，其他没有全公司范围内政策制定权的高管不包括在这一定义中，例如分公司或者子公司的高管。对于其他所有员工，任何在规则生效前签订的竞业禁止协议将于2024年9月4日起失效。这一规则的这一方面预计将影响广泛的行业和职业，为所有员工创造更公平的竞争环境。
为了确保合规，FTC制定了雇主通知要求。雇主必须通知当前受竞业禁止协议约束的员工，这些协议将在生效日期后无效。这一规则代表了雇佣法领域的里程碑发展，对雇主和员工都有深远影响。FTC的决定凸显了促进公平竞争和保护员工权利的承诺，预示着一个员工流动性和企业责任的新纪元。

U.S. DOS Updated the list of Sanctions on Entities and Individuals Involved with Russia

美国国务院及美国财政部更新对涉俄实体和个人的制裁清单

Jordan Liu刘泽辉

July 11, 2024

BACKGROUND

On June 12, 2024, the United States announced its new actions to wear down Russia’s capability to hold its warring effort against Ukraine, sanctioning more than 300 individuals and entities, right before G7 leaders met in Italy on June 13-15. Among this action, the U.S. Department of State (DOS) is imposing more than 100 new sanctions against related individuals and entities. These actions were implemented not only to 1) solve sanction evasions and backfilling, but also to 2) target entities in multiple third countries, including the People’s Republic of China (the “PRC”). DOS also aimed to constrain Russia’s future energy revenues, weaken Russia’s defense industrial base, as well as designate authorities responsible for the humanitarian concerns over Ukrainian children. All targets are being designated pursuant to Executive Order 14024 as amended by Executive Order 14114, which authorizes sanctions with respect to specified foreign activities of the Government of the Russian Federation.

On the same date, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (DOT)’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) also acted in accordance with DOS’s action and updated their Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List. OFAC’s actions targeted at the risk of secondary sanctions for foreign financial institutions that deal with Russia’s war economy and aimed to restrict the ability of the Russian military-industrial base to take advantage of certain U.S. software and information technology (IT) services. This determination is made pursuant to Executive Orders 14071 and 14024.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE SANCTIONS

One of the main objectives of this sanction is to disrupt sanction evasion and backfilling efforts, where Russia procures technology and equipment from third countries to support its war effort. To do that, this objective targets producers, exporters, and importers of items critical to Russia’s military-industrial base. Those items include items on the Common High Priority List (CHPL) identified by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). CHPL is ranked into four tiers, with the most concerning listed as Tier 1, and the least concerning listed as Tier 4. Russia’s efforts to procure high-priority items create significant risks that persons both inside the US and globally may become entangled in violations of U.S. export controls and sanctions laws. Foreign parties engaged in activity contrary to U.S. foreign policy and national security interests may also be added to BIS’s Entity List or OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List.

Tiers and Descriptions:

Tier 1
- Items of the highest concern due to their critical role in the production of advanced Russian precision-guided weapons systems, Russia’s lack of domestic production, and limited global manufacturers.

Tier 2
- Additional electronics items for which Russia may have some domestic production capability but a preference to source from the United States and its partners and allies.

Tier 3.A
- Further electronic components used in Russian weapons systems, with a broader range of suppliers.

Tier 3.B
- Mechanical and other components utilized in Russian weapons systems.

Tier 4.A
- Manufacturing, production, and quality testing equipment for electric components, circuit boards, and modules.

Tier 4.B
- Computer Numerically Controlled (CNC) machine tools and components.

It is alleged that entities in the PRC, the UAE, and other countries continue to sell these items and other key dual-use goods listed on CHPL to Russia. DOS is “particularly concerned by the scale and breadth of dual-use goods exports from the PRC.” DOS alleges that the PRC is filling the critical gaps in Russia’s defense production cycle to produce weapons. In the June 12 notice released by DOS, seven PRC-based entities were alleged to have supported Russia’s war effort (Sanctioned individuals and entities are listed at the end of this section and are numbered for the convenience of the readers of this newsletter). DOS marked entity 1 to operate or have operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian Federation economy. Entities 2-5 on this list are marked by DOS for operating or having operated in the technology sector of the Russian Federation economy. Entity 6 is being designated for operating or having operated in the aerospace sector of the Russian Federation economy. Entity 7 is being designated for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy.

DOS identifies further objectives other than sanction evasion and backfilling efforts, including degrading Russia’s future energy production and export capacity. Similar to the previous objective, DOS also identified entities that they would take action against. Among the list of this objective is Entity 8, another PRC entity. DOS stated that this entity has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of LLC ARCTIC LNG 2, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024.

Here are the names of the entities and a brief description of the allegation that DOS made. (Please be advised that the information contained in this list and the factual allegations presented are made and published by the U.S. Department of State. They do not reflect the beliefs or opinions of the author or DeHeng Chen LLC).

POLY TECHNOLOGIES INCORPORATED (PTI)

a PRC defense company and state-owned enterprise that has shipped dual-use and defense-related equipment to numerous U.S.-designated Russian defense sector entities since February 2022. PTI has previously been subject to Department of State nonproliferation-related sanctions and was added to the Department of Commerce's Entity List in June 2014.

2. BEIJING DEEPCOOL INDUSTRIES CO LTD

a PRC-based company involved in the supply of over $1 million worth of CHPL items to Russian companies, including the U.S.-designated, Russia-based AKTSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO TASKOM and OOO NOVYI AI TI PROEKT.

3. WUHAN TIANYU INFORMATION INDUSTRY CO LTD

a PRC-based company involved in the supply of over $900,000 worth of CHPL items to Russia, including to the U.S.-designated, Russia-based JOINT STOCK COMPANY ALFA-BANK.

4. ASIALINK SHANGHAI INTL LOGISTICS CO LTD (ASIALINK)

a PRC-based company involved in the supply of CHPL items to several U.S.-designated Russia-based companies, including LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KVAZAR, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY MDIKAM EK, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY SPETSVOLTAZH, PETERSBURG INTELLIGENT TRANSPORT LOGISTICS, and LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY GALIKA SERVIS. ASIALINK sent at least 1,350 shipments of CHPL items to LLC MDIKAM EK, 800 shipments of CHPL items to LLC SPETSVOLTAZH, and 400 shipments of CHPL items to PETERSBURG INTELLIGENT TRANSPORT LOGISTICS. Products shipped include electronic integrated circuits and other controlled electronic components.

5. 3NOD DIGITAL HONG KONG LIMITED

a Hong Kong-based company involved in the supply of over $1 million worth of CHPL to Russian companies, including the U.S.-designated, Russia-based OBLTRANSTERMINAL.

6. MILE HAO XIANG TECHNOLOGY CO LTD

a PRC-based company involved in the supply of components to Russian customers.

7. GUANGDONG PRATIC CNC TECHNOLOGY CO LTD

a PRC-based company involved in the supply of over $1.9 million CHPL items to Russian customers, including the U.S.-designated, Russia-based UMAC LLC. UMAC LLC has a public history of supplying machine tools - both domestic and foreign-produced - to the Russian military-industrial base, and its past customers include U.S.-designated, Russia-based battle tank manufacturer JSC RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION CORPORATION URALVAGONZAVOD NAMED AFTER F.E. DZERZHINSKY.

8. PENGLAI JUTAL OFFSHORE ENGINEERING HEAVY INDUSTRIES CO

a PRC-based shipyard operator which has constructed and shipped critical natural gas liquefaction technology, aboard previously blocked vessels AUDAX, PUGNAX, and HUNTER STAR, to LLC ARCTIC LNG

Other than the PRC, there are also Belarus-based networks alleged by DOS to be supporting the Russian Military. One Russian state-owned enterprise and 4 Belarusian companies were covered on this list, as well as 5 personnel related to these entities. Beyond Belarus and the PRC, 19 more entities from other countries, including the UAE, Moldova, Türkiye, Kyrgyzstan, and Singapore, are also listed. Beyond this, one port operator that provided services to blocked Russian Vessels is also identified.

Beyond these two objectives, further objectives disclosed in this notice include targeting Russia’s metals and mining industry, maintaining the pressure on State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom (Rosatom), constraining Russia’s military-industrial base, and promoting accountability for certain questionable entities and individual actors. In these remaining objectives, no more PRC entities were named.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY SANCTIONS

On Dec. 22, 2023, President Biden expanded the tools available for DOT to impose sanctions on foreign financial institutions for aiding Russia’s military-industrial base, in order to sabotage and compromise Russia’s war machine. The new actions posed by DOT broadened the definition of Russia’s military-industrial base to include all persons blocked pursuant to Executive Order 14024. This means that foreign financial institutions risk being sanctioned for conducting or facilitating significant transactions, or providing any services, involving any person blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024. In order to clarify the risk for those foreign financial institutions faced by such aforementioned transactions, OFAC updated the SDN list for five sanctioned Russian financial institutions.

Further, DOS worked with the U.S. Department of Commerce, and in line with G7 efforts to disrupt the Russian military-industrial base’s reliance on foreign IT systems, the Treasury has taken steps to restrict the Russian military-industrial base’s access to certain software and IT-related services. To do that, the Treasury, in consultation with the Department of State, has issued a new determination under E.O. 14071, which prohibits the supply to any person in the Russian Federation of 1) IT consultancy and design services; and 2) IT support services and cloud-based services for enterprise management software and design and manufacturing software.

In the current action, the sanction of DOT is also manifold. The main reasons include 1) sanction evasion, circumvention, and backfill; 2) disrupting Russia’s domestic war economy; 3) limiting Russia’s future revenue from liquified natural gas.

Firstly, DOT claims that Russia relies on complex transactional supply chains to feed its war machine and enable the production of materials to sustain its war effort. DOT further claims that Russia tried to evade sanctions by using these networks and complicated schemes to move money and other valuable assets. In this sanction, DOT targets more than a dozen of these types of networks, pinpointing more than a dozen of these types of networks, and designating more than 90 individuals and entities across Russia, Belarus, the British Virgin Islands, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the PRC, Serbia, South Africa, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates.

Several PRC-related individuals and entities were alleged to be involved in a few of those alleged transnational supply chain networks as shown in the table below. All of those individuals/entities were also added to the updated SDN, and the specific sanction reasons will be mentioned in the tables at the end of this section. Some individuals’ names are mentioned for the purpose of reference if they are related to sanctioned entities.

Second, DOT claims that Russia has transformed into a war economy in which companies across the Russian industry contribute to Russia’s war effort. This sanction by DOT reflects the complicated situation of the Russian war economy by targeting more than 100 entities that operate or have operated in the defense and related material, manufacturing, technology, transportation, or financial services sector of the Russian Federation economy.

Third, driven by promises made by President Biden and G7 leaders to limit Russia’s future energy revenues and impede Russia’s development of future energy projects, DOT targets entities involved in three liquefied natural gas projects that Russia hopes to bring online in the future in the sanctions today, including the Obsky LNG, Arctic LNG 1, and Arctic LNG 3 projects. Not only this, but DOT’s sanction also includes designations of three entities involved in either construction of natural gas-related projects or manufacturing specialized equipment for LNG transportation, as well as identification of seven under-construction LNG vessels.

Please see the several tables below for the sanctioned PRC-related individuals, entities, and entities that now have PRC addresses after changes to the SDN List. (Please be advised that the information contained in this list and the factual allegations presented are made and published by the U.S. Department of the Treasury. They do not reflect the beliefs or opinions of the author or DeHeng Chen LLC. The Chinese version of the entities, if available, is provided by DOT.)

CONSEQUENCE OF SANCTION

The consequences of these sanction-related actions are manifold. As published by both DOS and DOT, for the designated persons described in this notice, their property and interests in property in the U.S. or in possession of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). All entities and individuals that either directly or indirectly have ownership of 50% or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Beyond this, all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the U.S. that involve any property or interest in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons are prohibited unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or exempt. These prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person and the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.

DISCLAIMER

The information contained in this document is derived from various external sources, including official publications and publicly available data from the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of the Treasury. While we endeavor to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the information provided, we do not guarantee its completeness or timeliness. The content reflects the information available at the time of publication and may be subject to change. Readers are encouraged to verify the information independently and consult with relevant authorities or professionals before taking any actions based on the content of this document.

简概

当地时间2024年6月12日，在七国集团（G7）领导人于6月13-15日在意大利举行会议之前，美国宣布了新一轮针对超过300个个人和实体的制裁，意图削弱俄罗斯对乌克兰的作战能力。此次制裁行动中，有超过100个相关个人和实体被美国国务院列入新一轮制裁清单。这些制裁旨在1）解决对制裁的规避以及回补问题，2）针对包括中国在内的多个第三国的实体美国国务院还意图限制俄罗斯未来的能源收入，削弱俄罗斯的国防工业基础，以及指定应对乌克兰儿童人道主义问题承担责任的当局。所有目标都是根据经第 14114 号行政命令修订的第 14024 号行政命令指定的，该行政命令授权对俄罗斯联邦政府的特定对外活动实施制裁。

同日，美国财政部的外国资产控制办公室（OFAC）也根据DOS的行动采取了行动，更新了其特别指定国民和受阻人员（SDN）名单。OFAC的行动针对与俄罗斯战争经济有所往来的外国金融机构受到二级制裁的风险，旨在限制俄罗斯军工产业利用某些美国软件和信息技术 (IT) 服务的能力。本决定是根据第 14071及14024 号行政命令制定的。

美国国务院的制裁

此次制裁的主要目标之一是破坏俄罗斯通过第三国采购技术和设备来支持其战争努力的制裁规避和回补的努力。为此，此次制裁的目标是俄罗斯军事工业基础所需的重要物品的生产商、出口商和进口商。这些物品包括美国商务部工业与安全局（BIS）确定的“共同高优先级列表”（CHPL）上的物品。CHPL分为四个等级，其中最令美方担忧的列为一级，最不令美方担忧的列为四级。俄罗斯采购高优先级物品的努力使美国和全球人员都可能卷入违反美国出口管制和制裁法的风险。参与与美国对外政策和国家安全利益相悖活动的外国当事人也可能被列入BIS的实体清单或OFAC的SDN清单。

优先级以及其说明:

第1级
- 由于其在俄罗斯先进的精确制导武器系统生产中的关键作用、俄罗斯国内生产的缺乏以及全球制造商的有限性，因此是最受令美方担忧的项目。
第 2 级
- 俄罗斯可能具有一定国内生产能力，但更倾向于从美国及其合作伙伴和盟国采购的其他电子产品。
第 3.A 级
- 俄罗斯武器系统中使用的由更广泛的供应商生产的更多电子元件。
第 3.B 级
- 俄罗斯武器系统中使用的机械部件和其他部件。
第 4.A 级
- 电气元件、电路板和模块的制造、生产和质量检测设备。
第 4.B 级
- 计算机数控（CNC）机床和部件。

据称，中国、阿联酋和其他国家的实体继续向俄罗斯销售这些物品和CHPL上列出的其他关键两用商品。美国国务院对“从中国出口的两用商品”的规模和范围特别关注。美国国务院指控中国在填补俄罗斯国防生产周期中的关键缺口，从而帮助其生产武器。在美国国务院于6月12日发布的通知中，七个中国实体被指控支持俄罗斯的作战能力 (被制裁个人与实体列于本节末尾，另加以编号，以便本通讯读者参考）。美国国务院标记的实体1被控在俄罗斯联邦经济的国防和相关物资方面运营或曾运营。列表中的实体2-5被美国国务院指控为在俄罗斯联邦经济的技术方面运营或曾运营。实体6被控在俄罗斯联邦经济的航空航天方面运营或曾运营。实体7被控在俄罗斯联邦经济的制造业方面运营或曾运营。

除制裁规避和回补努力之外，美国国务院还确定了包括削弱俄罗斯未来的能源生产和出口能力的其他目标。与前一个目标类似，美国国务院还确定了他们将采取行动的实体。在这一目标的清单中有一个中国实体（即实体8）。美国国务院宣称，此实体实质上协助，赞助，或提供了金融、物质、技术支持、或商品/服务给/支持了财产和权益被依据14024号行政命令冻结的LLC ARCTIC LNG 2。

以下是实体名称及美国国务院所做指控的简要描述。（请注意，本清单中包含的信息和提出的事实指控是由美国国务院提出并公布的。它们并不反映作者或德恒（纽约）律师事务所的立场或观点。实体的中文名称翻译（如有）由美国财政部提供。）

1. POLY TECHNOLOGIES INCORPORATED (简体中文: 保利科技有限公司) (PTI）：

一家中国国防公司和国有企业，自2022年2月以来，已向多个美国制裁的俄罗斯国防部门实体运送两用和国防相关设备。保利科技有限公司之前曾因不扩散相关问题受到美国国务院的制裁，并于2014年6月被列入美国商务部的实体清单。

2. BEIJING DEEPCOOL INDUSTRIES CO LTD (简体中文：北京市鑫全盛科技有限公司)：一家中国公司，向包括美国制裁的俄罗斯公司AKTSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO TASKOM和OOO NOVYI AI TI PROEKT在内的俄罗斯公司供应了价值超过100万美元的CHPL物品。

3. WUHAN TIANYU INFORMATION INDUSTRY CO LTD：

一家中国公司，向包括美国制裁的俄罗斯公司JOINT STOCK COMPANY ALFA-BANK在内的俄罗斯公司供应了价值超过90万美元的CHPL物品。

4. ASIALINK SHANGHAI INTL LOGISTICS CO LTD (ASIALINK) (简体中文: 上海凌豪国际货物运输代理有限公司); a.k.a (简体中文: 亚凌(上海)国际货物运输代理有限公司))：

一家中国公司，向多家美国制裁的俄罗斯公司（包括LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KVAZAR、LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY MDIKAM EK、LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY SPETSVOLTAZH、PETERSBURG INTELLIGENT TRANSPORT LOGISTICS和LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY GALIKA SERVIS）供应CHPL物品。上海凌豪国际货物运输代理有限公司向LLC MDIKAM EK发送了至少1350批次CHPL物品，向LLC SPETSVOLTAZH发送了800批次CHPL物品，向PETERSBURG INTELLIGENT TRANSPORT LOGISTICS发送了400批次CHPL物品。运送的产品包括电子集成电路和其他受控电子元件。

5. 3NOD DIGITAL HONG KONG LIMITED (繁体中文: 三諾數字(香港)有限公司) ：

一家香港公司，向包括美国制裁的俄罗斯公司OBLTRANSTERMINAL在内的俄罗斯公司供应了价值超过100万美元的CHPL物品。

6. MILE HAO XIANG TECHNOLOGY CO LTD (简体中文: 弥勒浩翔科技有限公司) ：

一家中国公司，向俄罗斯客户供应零部件。

7. GUANGDONG PRATIC CNC TECHNOLOGY CO LTD (简体中文: 广东普拉迪数控科技有限公司) ：

一家中国公司，向包括美国制裁的俄罗斯公司UMAC LLC在内的俄罗斯客户供应了价值超过190万美元的CHPL物品。UMAC LLC公开记录表明其向俄罗斯军工基础供应机床，包括国内和国外生产的机床，其过去的客户包括美国制裁的俄罗斯战车制造商JSC RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION CORPORATION URALVAGONZAVOD NAMED AFTER F.E. DZERZHINSKY。

8. PENGLAI JUTAL OFFSHORE ENGINEERING HEAVY INDUSTRIES CO (简体中文: 蓬莱巨涛海洋工程重工有限公司) ：

一家中国船厂运营商，已建造并运送关键的天然气液化技术，通过之前被封锁的船只AUDAX、PUGNAX和HUNTER STAR，运送给LLC ARCTIC LNG

除了中国外，还有以白俄罗斯为基础的网络被美国国务院指控支持俄罗斯军方。一家俄罗斯国有企业，四家白俄罗斯公司，以及与这些实体相关的五个人员亦被列入此清单。除了白俄罗斯和中国，阿联酋、摩尔多瓦、土耳其、吉尔吉斯斯坦和新加坡的另外19个实体也在此清单上。除此之外，清单中还列出了一家为被封锁的俄罗斯船只提供服务的港口运营商。

除了这两个目标外，本通知中披露的其他目标包括针对俄罗斯的金属和采矿业，继续对俄罗斯国家原子能公司Rosatom施压，限制俄罗斯的军事工业基础，以及促使某些可疑实体和个人行为者承担责任。在剩余的这些目标中则没有更多的中国实体被提及。

美国财政部的制裁

2023年12月22日，拜登总统扩增了美国财政部对援助俄罗斯军工基础的外国金融机构实施制裁的手段以破坏和损害俄罗斯的战争机器。美国财政部在本次制裁中扩大了对俄罗斯军工基础的定义，并将根据第 14024 号行政命令被封锁的所有个人或实体都包括在内。这意味着外国金融机构在进行或协助涉及根据第 14024 号行政命令被封锁的任何人的重大交易或提供任何服务时，都有可能受到制裁。为了明确外国金融机构因上述交易而面临的风险，OFAC更新了五家受制裁俄罗斯金融机构的 SDN 名单。

此外，美国财政部与美国商务部合作，并根据七国集团（G7）为破坏俄罗斯军工基础对外国 IT 系统的依赖而做出的努力，美国财政部已采取措施限制俄罗斯军工基础获得某些软件和 IT 相关服务。为此，美国财政部与美国国务院协商后，根据第14071号行政命令发布了一项新的决定，禁止向俄罗斯联邦的任何人提供 1) IT 咨询和设计服务；以及 2) 企业管理软件和设计制造软件的 IT 支持服务和基于云的服务。

在本次制裁中，美国财政部的制裁也是多方面的。主要目标包括：1）制裁入侵、规避和回补；2）打击俄罗斯的国内战争经济；3）限制俄罗斯的未来液化天然气收入。

首先，美国财政部认为，俄罗斯依靠复杂的跨国供应链来支持其战争机器，并使物资生产能够维持其作战能力。美国财政部进一步提出，在此类网络的协助下，俄罗斯还试图使用复杂的计划来转移资金，其他贵重资产来逃避制裁。美国财政部在此次制裁中针对十几个此类网络，在俄罗斯、白俄罗斯、英属维京群岛、保加利亚、哈萨克斯坦、吉尔吉斯共和国、中华人民共和国、塞尔维亚、南非、土耳其和阿拉伯联合酋长国（阿联酋）指定了90多个个人和实体。

如下表所示，一些与中国有关的个人和实体被指控参与了其中几个被指控的跨国供应链网络。所有这些个人/实体也被添加到更新的 SDN 清单中，具体的制裁原因将在本节末尾的表格中提及。如果某些个人与受制裁实体有关，则提及这些个人的姓名以供参考。实体的中文名称翻译（如有）由美国财政部提供。

第二，美国财政部称俄罗斯已经转变为战争经济，以至于俄罗斯各行各业的公司都为俄罗斯的作战能力做出了贡献。美国财政部的这一次制裁反映了俄罗斯国内战争经济的复杂格局，并针对了100多个在俄罗斯联邦经济的国防和相关物资、制造、技术、运输或金融服务方面运营或已经运营的实体。

第三，在拜登总统和七国集团领导人承诺限制俄罗斯未来能源收入并阻碍俄罗斯未来能源项目发展的指导下，财政部本次制裁的目标是俄罗斯参与希望未来上线的三个液化天然气（LNG）项目的实体：Obsky LNG、北极液化天然气1和北极液化天然气3项目。本次美国财政部的制裁还包括指定三个参与建设天然气相关项目或制造液化天然气运输专用设备的实体，以及确定七艘正在建设中的液化天然气船。

下表是被制裁的与中国有关的个人、实体，以及在 SDN 名单变更后现在拥有中国地址的实体。（请注意，本清单中包含的信息和提出的事实指控是由美国财政部制定和公布的。它们并不反映作者或德恒（纽约）律师事务所的立场或观点。实体的中文名称翻译（如有）由美国财政部提供）。

被列入SDN清单的中国相关个人姓名及制裁信息：

CHEN, Ting (a.k.a. CHEN, Sharry; a.k.a. "TING, Chen")：

Chen在中国深圳和中国香港有地址；二级制裁风险。与 AK Microtech 的中国中介有关。据称，Ting Chen 是Shenzhen CSI 的总经理和所有者。 Chen还参与了一项规避制裁的计划，在该计划中，AKM 试图通过Shenzhen CSI 获得技术。 Chen还拥有香Way Good Technology Limited。

2. CHICHENEV, Alexey (Cyrillic: ЧИЧЕНЕВ, Алексей) (a.k.a. CHICHENEUVE, Alex; a.k.a. CHICHENEUVE, Alexey)：

Chichenev是俄罗斯公民；二级制裁风险。Chichenev管理着一个以香港为基地的大型微电子采购网络。据称，Chichenev 利用他的香港进口出口公司网络，包括 Superchip Limited 和 Kvantek Limited，向俄罗斯运送了价值数百万美元的电子集成电路和其他高优先级技术产品。美国财政部列出了Chichenev的香港地址。Superchip Limited亦在本次制裁中被列入 SDN 实体名单。

3. LEE, Lap Shun (a.k.a. "LEE, Francis") ：

Lee 出生于香港；国籍中国；二级制裁风险。与 AK Microtech 的中国中介有关。据称，Lee曾代表Shenzhen CSI与 AKM 进行多次交易，包括 AKM 试图规避对俄罗斯制裁的计划。

4. WU, Yi Xuan ：

Wu是中国公民；二级制裁风险。据称，Wu是 Daytek 公司的董事。 Wu曾帮助俄罗斯同行逃避制裁，并为俄罗斯军工基础获取技术。

5. XIAOLU, Mu ：

Mu出生于中国绵阳，中国国籍，现居香港，二级制裁风险。与Sudakov黄金洗钱网络有关。据称，Mu 是美国制裁的俄罗斯国有黄金生产商公共股份公司 Polyus 的一名雇员的同事。据称，他们参与了一个复杂、多层次的洗钱计划，即通过包括香港幌子公司在内的实体，将销售俄罗斯产黄金的付款转换为法定货币和加密货币。该计划利用包括 Holden International Trading Limited 和 Taube Precious HK Limited 在内的多家香港贸易公司，将与黄金销售有关的付款通过外国金融机构转回俄罗斯金融系统。

被列入SDN清单的中国相关实体名称及制裁信息：

1. 3NOD DIGITAL HONG KONG LIMITED (Chinese Traditional: 三諾數字(香港)有限公司) ：

位于香港；二级制裁风险。由美国国务院列出制裁理由（美国国务院的制裁措施请参阅上文中的相关表格）。

2. ANALOG TECHNOLOGY LIMITED ：

位于中国香港；二级制裁风险。据称，Analog Technology司是一家电子元件分销商，在中国设有分支机构，该公司向包括美国制裁的 LLC Spetselservis 和Limited Liability Company Spetsvoltazh 在内的俄罗斯公司运送了包括电子集成电路在内的高优先级物品。

3. ASIALINK SHANGHAI INTL LOGISTICS CO LTD (a.k.a. YALING (SHANGHAI) INTERNATIONAL CARGO TRANSPORTATION AGENCY CO LTD (Chinese Simplified: 上海凌豪国际货物运输代理有限公司); a.k.a. YALING (SHANGHAI) INTERNATIONAL FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION AGENCY CO LTD (Chinese Simplified: 亚凌(上海)国际货物运输代理有限公司)) ：

位于中国上海；二级制裁风险。由美国国务院列出制裁理由。

4. BARGAWINE HONG KONG LIMITED (Cyrillic: КОМПАНИЯ С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ БАРГАВАЙН ГОН-КОНГ ЛИМИТЕД)

位于中国香港；二级制裁风险。 (与 Chichenev 微电子采购网有关。 Chichenev 是 Bargawine（香港）有限公司的董事。

5. BEIJING DEEPCOOL INDUSTRIES CO LTD (Chinese Simplified: 北京市鑫全盛科技有限公司) (a.k.a. BEIJING XINQUANSHENG TECHNOLOGY CO LTD) ：

位于中国北京；二级制裁风险。由美国国务院列出制裁理由。

6. CHONGQING FAGIMA ELECTROMECHANICAL EQUIPMENT CO LTD (a.k.a. HYPER MACHINE TOOLS; a.k.a. ZHONGQING FA JIMA MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT CO LTD) ：

位于中国重庆；二级制裁风险。与俄罗斯机床规避网络有关。据称，Chongqing Fagima公司帮助向航空航天工业金属加工设备和高精密部件供应商和生产商 Newton ITM 公司运送外国原产机床。

7. CHONGQING XIANUOFUGELUODE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMPANY (CXI)：

位于中国重庆；二级制裁风险。据称，自 2022 年 2 月以来，CXI已向俄罗斯运送了数十批技术，包括集成电路。据称，CXI还为俄罗斯军工基地实体获取了技术。

8. DAYTEK CHONGQING INTERNATIONAL TRADE CO (a.k.a. DAIFEKU INTERNATIONAL TRADE CHONGQING CO LTD; a.k.a. DAYTEK TRADING) ：

位于中国重庆；二级制裁风险。据称，Daytek 为俄罗斯军工基地的终端用户购买了先进技术设备。中国公民 Yi Xuan Wu（Wu）是 Daytek 公司的董事。

9. ENKA TRADING LIMITED ：

位于中国香港；二级制裁风险。据称，Enka Trading Limited 是一家在电子设备和元件方面具有专门的批发商，为俄罗斯终端用户采购包括集成电路在内的电子元件提供了便利。

10. GBL INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS CO LTD ：

位于中国香港。与俄罗斯机床规避网络有关。据称，GBL 协助将外国原产机床运往 Newton-ITM，该公司是航空航天工业金属加工设备和高精度零件的供应商和生产商。

11. GKER LASER TECHNOLOGY CO LTD ：

位于中国上海；二级制裁风险。与为激光公司供货的中间商有关。据称，Gker Laser Technology Co Ltd 向 Lassard 公司发送了价值数十万美元的货物，包括激光二极管、光纤和激光器，Lassard 公司是一家由美国制裁的俄罗斯激光产品制造商，也是美国制裁的全俄实验物理科学研究院激光物理研究所的承包商。

12. GUANGDONG PRATIC CNC TECHNOLOGY CO LTD (Chinese Simplified: 广东普拉迪数控科技有限公司) ：

位于中国珠海; 二级制裁风险。由美国国务院列出制裁理由。

13. HANGZHOU KEMING INTELLIGENT TECHNOLOGY CO LTD (a.k.a. HANGZHOU KEMING INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGY CO LTD) (HKIT) ：

位于中国杭州；二级制裁风险。与 AK Microtech 的中国中间商有关。据称，HKIT 向 AKM 托运了数十批货物，并向 AKM 的所有者兼董事拥有的另一家俄罗斯公司 Keko R 托运了货物。据称这些货物包括用于生产电子元件的薄膜等技术。

14. HK NICEST ELECTRIC TECHNOLOGY CO LIMITED ：

位于中国香港；二级制裁风险。据称，HK Nicest 向总部设在俄罗斯的最终用户发送了 100 多批高优先级物品，包括电子集成电路、钽电容器和多层陶瓷电容器。 HK Nicest 曾向俄罗斯国防工业的最终用户供应设备，为其生产航空设备提供电子产品。 HK Nicest 的俄罗斯买家之一是美国制裁的俄罗斯电子公司 Streloi Ekommerts。

15. HOLDEN INTERNATIONAL TRADING LIMITE ：

位于中国香港，二级制裁风险。与Sudakov黄金洗钱网络有关。据称，Holden帮助实施了一个复杂、多层次的洗钱计划，即通过外国金融机构将与黄金销售有关的付款方式返回俄罗斯金融系统，从而将销售俄罗斯原产黄金的付款转换为法定货币和加密货币。

16. INFINITE FORCE CARGO SERVICE HK LIMITED ：

位于中国香港；二级制裁风险。与无人系统采购网有关。 Infinite Force 被指控向 Unmanned Systems 公司发送了无人驾驶飞机的相机镜头，并向其他俄罗斯最终用户发送了电子集成电路、钽电容器和多层陶瓷电容器等高优先级物品，其中包括美国制裁的 Silkway Limited Liability Company。

17. JINAN KEWEI OPTICS CO LTD (Chinese Simplified: 济南科唯光学有限公司) ：

位于中国济南；二级制裁风险。与向激光公司供货的中间商有关。据称，济南科唯光学有限公司向Leningrad Laser System（该公司在俄罗斯从事激光和光纤领域创新解决方案的供应、集成和开发）和美国制裁的电子公司 Staut Company Limited 发送了价值数十万美元的货物，包括电子集成电路、钽电容器和多层陶瓷电容器。

18. KEKOTECH EQUIPMENT LIMITED ：

位于中国香港；二级制裁风险。 (与 AK Microtech 的中国中间商有关。据称，Kekotech 还被用来向 AKM 提供货物。 Chen 也与 Kekotech 有关联。

19. KVANTEK LIMITED ：

位于中国香港；二级制裁风险。与 Chichenev 微电子采购网络有关。据称， Chichenev 利用他的香港进出口公司网络（包括 Kvantek）向俄罗斯运送了价值数百万美元的电子集成电路和其他高优先级技术产品。

20. MILE HAO XIANG TECHNOLOGY CO LTD (Chinese Simplified: 弥勒浩翔科技有限公司) ：

位于中国云南; 二级制裁风险。由美国国务院列出制裁理由。

21: NEW HORIZONS TRADING LIMITED ：

位于中国香港；二级制裁风险。 (相关实体：FABCENTER LLC；相关实体：OSTEC-ARTTOOL LTD）。与 Ostec Group逃避制裁网络有关。据称，New Horizons向 Fabcenter LLC（该公司是 Ostec Group的主要收货人）运送了数百批货物，并向 Ostec-Arttool Ltd（美国制裁的 Ostec Group实体之一）运送了数十批货物。

22. OLAX FINANCE LIMITED ：

位于中国香港；二级制裁风险。（相关个人：CHICHENEV, Alexey）。与 Chichenev 微电子采购网络有关。 Chichenev 是 Olax Finance Limited 的董事。

23. PAKO INTERNATIONAL TRADING LIMITED ：

位于中国香港；二级制裁风险。与 Elecom Network 有关。 Pako 被指控向包括 LLC Elecom 和美国制裁的Limited Liability Company Promelektro Engineering在内的俄罗斯公司运送高优先级物品，包括电子集成电路和变压器。

24. PENGLAI JUTAL OFFSHORE ENGINEERING HEAVY INDUSTRIES CO LTD (Chinese Simplified: 蓬莱巨涛海洋工程重工有限公司) (a.k.a. "PJOE") ：

位于中国烟台；二级制裁风险。（相关实体：LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ARCTIC LNG 2）。由美国国务院列出制裁理由。

25. POLY TECHNOLOGIES INCORPORATED (Chinese Simplified: 保利科技有限公司) (a.k.a. POLY TECHNOLOGIES INC; a.k.a. "PTI") ：

位于中国北京; 二级制裁风险。由美国国务院列出制裁理由。

26. SARIL OVERSEAS LIMITED ：

位于中国香港；二级制裁风险。（相关个人：CHICHENEV, Alexey）。与 Chichenev 微电子采购网络有关。 Chichenev 是 Saril Overseas Limited 的董事

27. SHANDONG KI FOREST NEW ADVANCED CO LTD (a.k.a. SHANDONG KESEN NEW MATERIAL CO LTD) ：

位于中国山东；二级制裁风险。据称，Shandong Ki Forest已向俄罗斯运送了数千批高优先级技术，包括半导体器件、电子集成电路、钽电容器、变压器、转换器和电感器。 Shandong Ki Forest在俄罗斯的主要客户是工业和专用电子元件供应商 Reomaks Limited Liability Company（Reomaks）和电子元件进口商 Solard。

28. SHANDONG OREE LASER TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. (Chinese Simplified: 山东欧锐激光科技有限公司) (a.k.a. "JINAN OREE LASER EQUIPMENT CO., LTD" (Chinese Simplified: "欧锐激光")) ：

位于中国济南；二级制裁风险。据称，欧锐激光是一家机床公司，曾向俄罗斯运送金属加工机床和其他相关设备。

29. SHANGHAI TRANSIT INTERNATIONAL FORWARDING AGENCY ：

位于中国上海；二级制裁风险。与Unmanned System采购网有关。据称，Shanghai Transit通过自己的集装箱列车向俄罗斯多个城市提供货物。 Shanghai Transit向俄罗斯的终端用户提供了价值超过 18 万美元的高优先级物品，包括电子集成电路、钽电容器和多层陶瓷电容器，其中包括向Unmanned System公司供应设备的用户。

30. SHENZHEN C S IM EXPORT LTD (a.k.a. "CS IM EXPORT LIMITED") (Shenzhen CSI) ：

位于中国深圳和中国昆山；二级制裁风险。与 AK Microtech 的中国中间商有关。据称，Shenzhen CSI 是 AKM 的大量技术供应商，其中包括高优先级项目，例如用于制造晶圆或晶片以及电气变压器、静态转换器和电感器的机器和设备。 Shenzhen CSI 还被指控帮助 AKM 将技术转移到俄罗斯。

31. SHENZHEN HUASHENG INDUSTRY CO LTD (Chinese Simplified: 深圳市华圣工业有限公司) (a.k.a. SHENZHEN HUASHENG INDUSTRIAL CO LTD) ：

位于中国深圳；二级制裁风险。与 Aero-HIT 网络有关。据称，深圳市华圣工业有限公司与俄罗斯 Aero-HIT 公司签订了合同，为 Aero-HIT 公司提供无人机部件，Aero-HIT 公司购买了设备和部件，生产 Veles 多旋翼第一人称视角攻击无人机的几种改型，该无人机曾被驻扎在赫尔松的俄罗斯军队用于打击乌克兰目标。

32. SHENZHEN YOUXIN TECHNOLOGY CO LTD ：

位于中国深圳；二级制裁风险。与 Elekkom Logistik Network 有关。据称，Shenzhen Youxin向 Elekkom Logistik 提供了价值 50 多万美元的电子集成电路、钽电容器和多层陶瓷电容器，此外还提供了俄罗斯无人侦察机上的芯片。

33. SUPERCHIP LIMITED ：

位于中国香港；二级制裁风险。与 Chichenev 微电子采购网络有关。据称， Chichenev 利用他的香港进出口公司网络（包括 Superchip）向俄罗斯运送了价值数百万美元的电子集成电路和其他高优先级技术产品。 Chichenev 是 Superchip 公司的董事和百分之百的所有者。

34. TAUBE PRECIOUS HK LIMITED ：

位于中国香港；二级制裁风险。与Sudakov黄金洗钱网络有关。据称，Taube 协助实施了一个复杂、多层次的洗钱计划，即通过外国金融机构将与黄金销售相关的付款方式返回俄罗斯金融系统，从而将销售俄罗斯原产黄金的付款转换为法定货币和加密货币。

35. TAVIT HONG KONG CO LIMITED ：

位于中国香港；二级制裁风险。与Nikolai Levin网络有关。据称，Tavit向 OOO Mayak 发送了价值 200 多万美元的美国制造的货物，而 OOO Mayak 被指控通过其在欧洲的贸易公司和综合仓库规避制裁，从欧洲、土耳其和阿联酋提供平行进口货物。 Mayak 公司由Nikolai Levin控制，而Levin共同拥有的土尔其 Expert Machinery Kimyasal Urunler Ticaret Limited Sirketi 公司（Expert Machinery）向 Mayak 公司和俄罗斯 OOO TAV 公司（TAV）发送了价值 50 多万美元的高优先级的国际商品统一分类制度代码货物，包括用于接收、转换和传输数据和集成电子电路的机器。 TAV 的所有人是俄罗斯人 Aleksandr Vasilyevich Tanchev（Tanchev），他也是 Tavit 的董事。

36. VALETUDO LIMITED ：

位于中国香港；二级制裁风险。与 Elecom Network 有关。据称 Valetudo 向包括 LLC Elecom 和 Promelektro Engineering 在内的俄罗斯公司运送了包括电子集成电路和电容器在内的高优先级物品。

37. VPOWER FINANCE SECURITY HONG KONG LIMITED：

位于中国香港；二级制裁风险。与Sudakov黄金洗钱网络有关。据称，VPower 公司帮助运输了原产于俄罗斯的黄金。

38.WAY GOOD TECHNOLOGY LIMITED ：

位于中国香港；二级制裁风险。与 AK Microtech 的中国中介有关。所有者为 Ting Chen。

39. WUHAN TIANYU INFORMATION INDUSTRY CO LTD (Chinese Simplified: 武汉天喻信息产业股份有限公司) ：

位于中国武汉；二级制裁风险。由美国国务院列出制裁理由。

40. YIWU XINGLU IMPORT AND EXPORT CO LTD ：

位于中国义乌；二级制裁风险。与 DP Microchip 网络有关。据称，Yiwu Xinglu公司向DP Microchip公司运送了数十批集成电路和其他电子产品，DP Microchip公司进口电子元件，包括高优先级的国际商品统一分类制度编码货物。

41. ZHEJIANG ZHENHUAN CNC MACHINE TOOL CO., LTD. (Chinese Simplified: 浙江震环数控机床股份有限公司) (a.k.a. "Z-MAT" (Chinese Simplified: "震环机床集团"))：

位于中国台州；二级制裁风险。据称，浙江震环数控机床股份有限公司是一家机床公司，曾向俄罗斯运送金属加工机床和其他相关设备。

与中国实体有关的 SDN 名单的变化：

1. PUBLIC JOINT STOCK COMPANY SBERBANK OF RUSSIA (Cyrillic: ПУБЛИЧНОЕ АКЦИОНЕРНОЕ ОБЩЕСТВО СБЕРБАНК РОССИИ) (f.k.a. JOINT STOCK COMMERCIAL SAVINGS BANK OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION; f.k.a. JOINT STOCK COMMERCIAL SAVINGS BANK OF THE RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATIVE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC; f.k.a. OJSC SBERBANK OF RUSSIA; f.k.a. OPEN JOINT STOCK COMPANY SBERBANK OF RUSSIA; f.k.a. OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO SBERBANK ROSSII; a.k.a. PJSC SBERBANK (Cyrillic: ПАО СБЕРБАНК); f.k.a. SBERBANK OF RSFSR; a.k.a. SBERBANK OF RUSSIA; a.k.a. SBERBANK ROSSII; f.k.a. SBERBANK ROSSII OAO; a.k.a. "SBERBANK INDIA"; a.k.a. "SBERBANK MUMBAI") ：

更新后，除与此实体相关的其他更改外，此实体还添加了以下地址： C305/306A Lufthansa Centre 50 Liangmaqiao Rd., Chaoyang District, Beijing 100027, China.

2. STATE CORPORATION BANK FOR DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS VNESHECONOMBANK (f.k.a. BANK FOR FOREIGN TRADE OF THE U.S.S.R.; a.k.a. GK VEB.RF; a.k.a. GOSUDARSTVENNAYA KORPORATSIYA RAZVITIYA VEB.RF; a.k.a. STATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VEB.RF (Cyrillic: ГОСУДАРСТВЕННАЯ КОРПОРАЦИЯ РАЗВИТИЯ ВЭБ.РФ); a.k.a. VEB.RF (Cyrillic: ВЭБ.РФ); f.k.a. VNESHECONOMBANK; f.k.a. VNESHEKONOMBANK GK; f.k.a. VNESHEKONOMBANK SSSR; a.k.a. "BANK FOR DEVELOPMENT"; a.k.a. "VEB") ：

更新后，除与此实体相关的其他更改外，此实体还添加了以下地址： 20A, CITIC Building, 19, Joanguomenwai Dajie, Beijing 100004, China

3. VTB CAPITAL HOLDINGS CLOSED JOINT STOCK COMPANY (a.k.a. HOLDING VTB CAPITAL CJSC; a.k.a. KHOLDING VTB KAPITAL ZAKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO; a.k.a. VTB CAPITAL HOLDING CJSC; a.k.a. VTB CAPITAL HOLDING ZAO; a.k.a. VTB CAPITAL HONG KONG LIMITED; a.k.a. VTB CAPITAL JSC) ：

更新后，除与此实体相关的其他更改外，此实体还添加了以下地址： Unit 2301, 23/F, Cheung Kong Center, 2 Queen's Road Central, Hong Kong. （关联实体: VTB BANK PUBLIC JOINT STOCK COMPANY）。

被制裁的后果

这次制裁相关行动的后果是多方面的。如美国国务院与美国财政部发布的通讯所述，对于本通知中描述的指定人员，其在美国或由美国人员持有的财产和财产利益将被封锁，并且必须向财政部外国资产控制办公室（OFAC）报告。所有由一个或多个被封锁人员直接或间接拥有50%以上股份的实体也将被封锁。除此之外，涉及指定或被封锁人员的任何财产或财产利益的所有交易，由美国人员或在美国内（或经过美国）进行的交易，除非由OFAC发布的一般或特定许可证授权或豁免，否则均被禁止。这些禁令包括由、向或为任何被封锁人员的利益提供任何资金、商品或服务的任何贡献或提供，以及从任何此类人员接收任何资金、商品或服务的贡献或提供。

免责声明

本文中包含的信息来源于各种外部资源，包括美国国务院和美国财政部的官方出版物和公开数据。尽管我们努力确保所提供信息的准确性和可靠性，但我们不对其完整性或时效性作任何保证。内容反映了发布时的可用信息，并可能会有所更改。建议读者独立验证信息，并在根据本文件内容采取任何行动之前咨询相关当局或专业人士。

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